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Abstract
Belief revision is concerned with incorporating new
information into a pre-existing set of beliefs. When
the new information comes from another agent, we
must first determine if that agent should be trusted.
In this paper, we define trust as a pre-processing
step before revision. We emphasize that trust in
an agent is often restricted to a particular domain
of expertise. We demonstrate that this form of trust
can be captured by associating a state partition with
each agent, then relativizing all reports to this parti-
tion before revising. We position the resulting fam-
ily of trust-sensitive revision operators within the
class of selective revision operators of Ferme´ and
Hansson, and we examine its properties. In partic-
ular, we show how trust-sensitive revision is ma-
nipulable, in the sense that agents can sometimes
have incentive to pass on misleading information.
When multiple reporting agents are involved, we
use a distance function over states to represent dif-
fering degrees of trust; this ensures that the most
trusted reports will be believed.
1 Introduction
We consider the manner in which trust impacts the process
of belief revision. Many approaches to belief revision require
that all new information presented for revision must be incor-
porated; however, this is clearly untrue in cases where infor-
mation comes from an untrusted source. In this paper, we are
concerned with the manner in which an agent uses an exter-
nal notion of trust in order to determine how new information
should be integrated with some pre-existing set of beliefs.
Our basic approach is the following. We introduce a model
where each agent only trusts other agents to be able to dis-
tinguish between certain states. We use this notion of trust
as a precursor to belief revision, transforming reported infor-
mation so that we only revise by the part that is trusted to be
correct. This is a form of selective revision [Ferme´ and Hans-
son, 1999]; we establish key properties of our trust-senstive
revision operator, and formally introduce the notion of ma-
nipulability. We then extend our model to a more general set-
ting, by introducing quantitative measures that allow agents
to compare degrees of trust.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Motivation
There are different reasons that an agent may or may not be
trusted. In this paper, our primary focus is on trust as a func-
tion of the perceived expertise of other agents. One agent will
trust information reported by another just in case they view
the reporting agent as an authority capable of drawing mean-
ingful distinctions over a particular domain. We introduce a
simple motivating example, which we revisit periodically.
Example 1 Consider an agent that visits a doctor, having dif-
ficulty breathing. The agent happens to be wearing a necklace
that prominently features a jewel on a pendant. During the ex-
amination, the doctor checks the patient’s throat for swelling;
at the same time, the doctor sees the necklace. Following the
examination, the doctor tells the patient “you have a viral in-
fection in your throat - and by the way, you should know that
the jewel in your necklace is not a diamond.”
Note that the doctor provides information about two dis-
tinct domains: human health and jewelry. In practice, a pa-
tient is likely to trust the doctor’s diagnosis about the viral
infection. However, the patient has little reason to trust the
doctor’s evaluation of the necklace. We suggest that a rational
agent should believe the doctor’s statement about the infec-
tion, while essentially ignoring the comment on the necklace.
This approach is dictated by the kind of trust that the patient
has in the doctor. Our aim in this paper is to formalize this
kind of domain-specific trust, and then demonstrate how this
form of trust is used to inform belief revision.
2.2 Belief Revision
Belief revision refers to the process in which an agent inte-
grates new information with some pre-existing beliefs. One
of the most influential approaches to belief revision is the
AGM approach. This approach is defined with respect to a
finite propositional vocabulary F. A belief set is a deduc-
tively closed set of formulas, representing the beliefs of an
agent. A revision operator is a function that takes a belief set
and a formula as input, and returns a new belief set. An AGM
revision operator is a revision operator that satisfies the AGM
postulates, as specified in [Alchourro´n et al., 1985].
A state is a propositional interpretation over F, and we
write 2F for the set of all states. It turns out that every AGM
revision operator is characterized by a total pre-order over
states. To be more precise, a faithful assignment is a func-
tion that maps each belief set to a total pre-order over states
in which the models of the belief set are minimal. When an
agent is presented with a new formula φ for revision, the re-
vised belief set is given by the set of all minimal models of φ
in the total pre-order given by the faithful assignment. We re-
fer the reader to [Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1992] for a proof
of this result, and a discussion of the implications. At present,
we simply need to know that each AGM revision operator is
associated with a faithful assignment.
3 A Model of Trust
3.1 Domain-Specific Trust
Assume a fixed propositional signature F and a set of agents
A. For each A ∈ A, let ∗A denote an AGM revision oper-
ator. This revision operator represents an “ideal” revision, in
which A has complete trust in the new information. We want
to modify the way this operator is used, by adding a represen-
tation of trust with respect to each agent B ∈ A.
We assume that all new information is reported by an agent,
so each formula for revision can be labelled with the name of
the reporting agent.1 At this point, we are not concerned with
degrees of trust or with conflicts between different sources.
We start with a binary notion of trust, where A either trusts B
or does not trust B with respect to a particular domain.
We encode trust by allowing each agent A to associate a
partition ΠBA over possible states with each agent B.
Definition 1 A state partition Π is a collection of subsets of
2F that is collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive. For
any s ∈ 2F, let Π(s) denote the element of Π containing s.
If Π = {2F}, we call Π the trivial partition with respect to
F. If Π = {{s} | s ∈ 2F}, we call Π the unit partition.
Definition 2 For eachA ∈ A the trust function TA is a func-
tion that maps each B ∈ A to a state partition ΠBA .
The partition ΠBA specifies the states that A will trust B to
distinguish. If ΠBA(s1) 6= ΠBA(s2), then A will trust that
B can distinguish between states s1 and s2. Conversely, if
ΠBA(s1) = Π
B
A(s2), then A does not see B as an authority
capable of distinguishing between s1 and s2. We clarify by
returning to our motivating example.
Example 2 Let A = {A,D, J} and let F = {sick, diam}.
Informally: D represents a doctor, J represents a jeweler,
sick is true if A has an illness ,and diam is true if A is wear-
ing a diamond. Following standard shorthand notation, we
represent a state s by the set of propositional symbols that
are true in s. We specify partitions by using the | symbol to
visually separate different cells. The following partitions are
intuitively plausible in this example:
ΠDA := {sick, diam}, {sick}|{diam}, ∅
ΠJA := {sick, diam}, {diam}|{sick}, ∅
Thus, A trusts the doctor D to distinguish between states
where A is sick as opposed to states where A is not sick.
1In domains involving sensing or other forms of discovery, we
allow an agent A to self-report information with complete trust.
However, A does not trust D to distinguish between states
that are differentiated by the authenticity of a diamond.
We emphasize that a trust partition is an agent’s percep-
tion of the expertise of others. When the doctor says that the
jewel is not a diamond, they may very well be giving an as-
sessment that they believe is correct. In this example, it is
actually reasonable to believe that the doctor feels that they
can tell diamond states from not diamond states; so they are
not necessarily being dishonest by providing this statement.
The trust partition held by A is a reflection of A’s view of the
doctor; it need not be correct.
3.2 Trust-Sensitive Belief Revision
In this section, we describe how an agent A combines the
revision operator ∗A with the trust function TA to define a
new, trust-sensitive revision operator ∗BA . In general, ∗BA will
not be an AGM operator. In particular, ∗BA normally will not
satisfy the Success postulate. This is a desirable feature.
If A is given a new formula φ for revision, the first thing to
consider is the source B and the distinctions they are trusted
to make. In other words, if A does not trust B to distinguish
between states s and t, then any report from B that provides
evidence for s also provides evidence for t. It follows that A
need not believe φ after revision; A interprets φ to be ev-
idence for every state s that is B-indistinguishable from a
model of φ. The next definition helps formalize this notion.
Definition 3 Let TA(B) = ΠBA . For every formula φ, define:
ΠBA [φ] =
⋃
{ΠBA(s) | s |= φ}.
So ΠBA [φ] is the union of all cells that contain a model of
φ. Based on the discussion above, a report of φ from B is
construed to be evidence for each state in ΠBA [φ].
Definition 4 Let TA(B) = ΠBA , and let ∗A be an AGM revi-
sion operator for A. For any belief set K with corresponding
ordering≺K given by the underlying faithful assignment, the
trust-sensitive revision K ∗BA φ is the set of formulas true in
min≺K
({s | s ∈ ΠBA [φ]}).
So rather than taking the minimal models of φ, we take all
minimal states among those that B can not be trusted to dis-
tinguish from the models of φ.
Example 3 Returning to our example, we consider a few dif-
ferent formulas for revision:
φ1 = sick; φ2 = ¬diam; φ3 = sick ∧ ¬diam.
Assume the initial belief set is given by the pre-order ≺K :
{diam} ≺K {sick, diam}, ∅ ≺K {sick}.
We have the following results for revision:
(1) K ∗DA φ1 = Cn(sick ∧ diam).
(2) K ∗DA φ2 = Cn(¬sick ∧ diam).
(3) K ∗DA φ3 = Cn(sick ∧ diam).
Result (1) shows that A believes when the doctor says that
they are sick; (2) indicates the doctor is not believed on the
subject of jewelry. Finally, (3) shows that an agent is able to
incorporate a part of a formula, because A only incorporates
the part of φ3 over which the doctor is trusted.
4 Formal Properties
4.1 Basic Results
We first consider extreme cases for trust-sensitive revision.
Intuitively, if TA(B) is the trivial partition, then A does not
trust B to be able to distinguish between any states. Hence,
A should not incorporate any information obtained from B.
Proposition 1 If TA(B) is the trivial partition, then K ∗BA
φ = K for all K and φ.
The other extreme situation occurs when TA(B) is the unit
partition, consisting of all singleton sets. In this case,A trusts
B to distinguish between every possible pair of states.
Proposition 2 If TA(B) is the unit partition, then ∗BA = ∗A.
Hence, ifB is universally trusted, then trust-sensitive revision
is just normal AGM revision.
Partitions are partially ordered by refinement. We say that
Π1 is a refinement of Π2 just in case, for each S1 ∈ Π1,
there exists S2 ∈ Π2 such that S1 ⊆ S2. For trust partitions,
refinement has a natural interpretation as “breadth of trust.”
Proposition 3 For any formula φ, if ΠBA is a refinement of
ΠCA, then K ∗CA φ ⊆ K ∗BA φ.
So ifB is trusted over a greater range of states, then receiving
φ from B yields a larger belief set than receiving φ from C.
4.2 Trust-Sensitive Revision as Selective Revision
Trust-sensitive revision is a specialized version of selective
revision [Ferme´ and Hansson, 1999]. An operator ◦ is a se-
lective revision operator if there exists an AGM revision op-
erator ∗ and a transformation function f taking formulas to
formulas such that, for all belief sets K and formulas φ,
K ◦ φ = K ∗ f(φ).
The operator ∗BA clearly falls under this scheme. It’s the
particular instance obtained by allowing f to be defined via
the state partition ΠBA with f(φ) = φ
B
A such that the models
of φBA are precisely the models in Π
B
A [φ].
Ferme´ and Hansson enumerate several properties for the
function f and prove correspondence results between proper-
ties of f and postulates for ◦. These results allow us to give
a list of sound postulates for trust-sensitive revision. The rel-
evant properties of f from [Ferme´ and Hansson, 1999] are as
follows2 (` and ≡ denote classical logical consequence and
equivalence respectively):
• f(⊥) ≡ ⊥ (falsity preservation)
• φ ` f(φ) (implication)
• f(f(φ)) ≡ f(φ) (idempotence)
• If φ ≡ ψ then f(φ) ≡ f(ψ) (extensionality)
• f(φ ∨ ψ) ≡ f(φ) ∨ f(ψ) (disjunctive distribution)
The above properties are familiar from topology. They essen-
tially express that f is a Kuratowski closure operator on the
space of subsets of states [Kuratowski, 1958]. We thus make
the following definition.
2The first property here does not actually appear in their paper.
Definition 5 A function f taking formulas to formulas sat-
isfying the above five properties will be called a Kuratowski
transformation function.
The next result is proved in [Ferme´ and Hansson, 1999].
Proposition 4 ([Ferme´ and Hansson, 1999]) Let ∗ be an
AGM revision operator and f be a Kuratowski transforma-
tion function. Then ◦ derived from ∗ and f satisfies all the
following postulates.
• K ◦ φ = Cn(K ◦ φ) (Closure)
• There is a formula ψ such that K ◦ φ ` ψ, φ ` ψ and
K ◦ φ = K ◦ ψ (Proxy success)
• K ◦ φ ⊆ Cn(K ∪ {φ}) (Inclusion)
• K ◦φ is consistent iff φ is consistent (Consistency)
• If φ ≡ ψ then K ◦ φ = K ◦ ψ (Extensionality)
• If K 6⊆ K ◦ φ then K ∪ (K ◦ φ) ` ⊥
(Consistent expansion)
• (K ◦ φ) ∩ (K ◦ ψ) ⊆ K ◦ (φ ∨ ψ) (Disjunctive
overlap)
• IfK ◦(φ∨ψ) 6` ¬φ thenK ◦(φ∨ψ) ⊆ K ◦φ (Dis-
junctive inclusion)
• K ◦ (φ∨ψ) is equal to one of K ◦φ, K ◦ψ or (K ◦φ)∩
(K ◦ ψ) (Disjunctive factoring)
The above postulates are mostly familiar from the literature
on belief change. The Success postulate is replaced by the
weaker Proxy success.
What, then, are the properties of trust-sensitive revision?
We can immediately state the following.
Proposition 5 Let f be defined via a state partition Π. Then
f is a Kuratowski transformation function. Thus every trust-
sensitive revision operator satisfies all the postulates listed in
Proposition 4.
Trust-sensitive revision also satisfies a new postulate:
Proposition 6 Every trust-sensitive revision operator satis-
fies the following postulate:
• There exist λ1, . . . , λm such that (i) (K ◦ λi) ∪ (K ◦
λj) ` ⊥ for i 6= j, and (ii) for all φ there exists a
set X ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} such that K ◦ φ = ⋂i∈X K ◦ λi
(Disjoint outcome basis)
Disjoint outcome basis says there is some finite basic set of
mutually inconsistent revision outcomes K ◦λ1, . . . ,K ◦λm
such that every revision outcome can be expressed as an inter-
section of them. In fact, roughly speaking, we may take the
λi to be the formulas that are closed under f , i.e., such that
f(λi) ≡ λi. It can be shown that this postulate does not hold
in general for selective revision operators defined via Kura-
towski transformation functions.
As we have seen, Success does not hold in general for trust-
sensitive revision. Even the following weaker version (which
is also implied by another of the basic AGM revision postu-
lates, namely Vacuity) fails [Hansson, 1997]:
• If K 6` ¬φ then K ◦ φ ` φ (Weak Success)
As an extreme counterexample to ∗BA failing Weak Success,
just take TA(B) to be the trivial partition so that K ∗BA φ does
not differ from K for any choice of φ. The failure of this rule
is a departure from Ferme´ and Hansson, who hold onto it by
always assuming the transformation function satisfies f(φ) ≡
φ whenever K 6` ¬φ. We argue this assumption makes little
sense in our setting: why should we accept information from
an untrusted source just because it happens to be consistent
with our current beliefs? Is there an even weaker variant of
Weak Success that holds for trust-sensitive revision? As a first
idea, one might suggest the following:
• If K 6` ¬φ and K ◦ ¬φ ` ¬φ then K ◦ φ ` φ
(Very Weak Success)
This rule roughly says that, if we trust B when it tells us φ
is false, then we should trust B when it tells us φ is true.
The decision on whether to accept B’s information about φ
is judged on B’s perceived ability to answer the yes-or-no
question of whether φ holds. This intuition is perhaps clearer
in the following equivalent formulation.
• IfK 6` ¬φ andK 6` φ then [K ◦φ ` φ iffK ◦¬φ ` ¬φ]
Trust-sensitive revision fails this postulate too, in general:
Proposition 7 There exists an AGM revision operator ∗ and
a state partition Π such that ◦ defined via ∗ and Π does not
satisfy Very Weak Success.
This result follows from the following counterexample,
which is given further motivation below.
Example 4 Suppose F = {p, q}, let K = Cn(q), and let
≺K be the total pre-order where the models of K are mini-
mal and everything else is maximal. Suppose that the trust
partition is Π = {p, q} | {q}, {p} | ∅. Then we have:
K 6` ¬p, K ◦ ¬p = Cn(¬p ∧ q), so K ◦ ¬p ` ¬p. However,
K ◦ p = Cn(q), so K ◦ p 6` p.
How disappointed should we be that Very Weak Success
fails? We argue that we need not be disappointed at all. The
partition Π in the example has the property that it can only
distinguish these cases: both p and q are true, neither is true,
exactly one is true. Thus, if we initially believe q, then no
report can ever make us believe p and ¬q. There is an asym-
metry here: we will trust a report that p is false, but we will
not trust a report that it is true.
We can frame the counterexample as the Dead Battery
Problem. Suppose a lamp requires two batteries to make a
bright light; it is dim with one good battery, and it is off with
zero. Now suppose you contribute one battery and your ad-
versary contributes the other. If your adversary tests the lamp
in private and tells you that their battery works, you will not
trust this conclusion. From your perspective, they may have
seen the dim light and jumped to the conclusion that their bat-
tery is working. So while you would accept a report that their
battery is dead, you will not accept a report that it works.
Although Very Weak Success does not hold, trust-sensitive
revision does manage to capture an even weaker variant of
Success.
Proposition 8 Every trust-sensitive revision operator satis-
fies the following postulate:
• If K 6` ¬φ and K ◦ ¬φ ` ¬φ then there exists a con-
sistent formula ψ such that ψ ` φ and K ◦ ψ ` φ.
(Feeble Success)
Feeble Success relaxes Very Weak Success by saying that if
we trust B when it tells us φ is false (and we didn’t already
believe ¬φ) thenB can also bring us to believe φ by telling us
φ perhaps in conjunction with some other “extra” evidence.
For instance in the Dead Battery Problem (Example 4), al-
though you do not accept the report of your adversary when
they tell you their battery is working (K ◦ p 6` p), you would
come to believe it is working if instead they reported that both
batteries are working (K ◦ (p ∧ q) = Cn(p ∧ q) ` p).
The proof that trust-sensitive revision satisfies Feeble Suc-
cess makes use of the fact that f defined via a state partition
satisfies the following property, which in topological terms
essentially says that the complement of a closed set of states
is itelf closed, i.e., every open set is closed.
• f(¬f(φ)) ≡ ¬f(φ)
Kuratowski transformation functions do not satisfy this in
general, and indeed Feeble Success is a property not shared
by every selective revision operator defined via a Kuratowski
function.
Proposition 9 There exists an AGM revision operator ∗ and
a Kuratowski transformation function f such that ◦ defined
via ∗ and f does not satisfy Feeble Success.
This is proved from the following counterexample.
Example 5 Suppose F = {p} and let f be specified by set-
ting f(⊥) ≡ ⊥, f(p) ≡ >, f(¬p) ≡ ¬p and f(>) ≡ >. (Ev-
ery other formula in this language is equivalent to precisely
one of ⊥, p,¬p,>, so these four values completely specify
f by appeal to equivalence.) One can check that f forms a
Kuratowski transformation function. Assume K = Cn(>),
so K ◦ φ = K ∗ f(φ) = Cn(f(φ)) for all φ and any AGM
revision operator ∗. Looking at f we see there is no consis-
tent formula ψ such that f(ψ) ` p and so there is no ψ such
that K ◦ ψ ` p. The consequent of Feeble Success (plugging
in φ = p) therefore cannot hold. But we have K 6` ¬p and
K ◦ ¬p = Cn(¬p) ` ¬p, thus the antecedent holds.
4.3 Manipulability
Next we consider a concept that has been extensively stud-
ied in areas such as voting theory, preference aggregation and
belief merging [Chopra et al., 2006; Everaere et al., 2007;
Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975], but that has not yet re-
ceived attention in the belief change literature, namely manip-
ulability. Let us assume that agent B, in passing information
information φ to A, does so with the communicative goal of
bringing about in A a belief in φ. Under this assumption, we
can ask: does B have any incentive to pass on any formula
other than φ? That is, is it possible that A will not believe φ
if given φ directly, but will believe it if given some other for-
mula ψ? The following postulate expresses that A can never
be manipulated in this way.
• If K ◦ φ 6` φ and ψ is consistent then K ◦ ψ 6` φ
(Non-manipulability)
We remark that a slight variant of Non-manipulability has ap-
peared in the literature (but with a different motivation) under
the name Regularity [Hansson et al., 2001].
Is trust-sensitive revision non-manipulable, i.e., does ◦ de-
fined from an AGM revision operator and a state partition
satisfy the above postulate? For our two extreme cases the
answer is yes: If Π is the unit partition then ◦ satisfies Suc-
cess, so of course B can then do no better than just telling
φ to A to achieve its goal, while if Π is the trivial partition
then B can say nothing at all to change A’s beliefs so in both
cases the postulate is trivially satisfied. However, in general
the answer is no, which can be seen from the following.
Proposition 10 If a revision operator ◦ satisfies both Feeble
Success and Non-Manipulability then it satisfies Very Weak
Success.
Since we have already seen that trust-sensitive revision sat-
isfies Feeble Success but not, in general Very Weak Success
(Propositions 7 and 8), we can immediately state:
Proposition 11 There exists an AGM revision operator ∗ and
a state partition Π such that ◦ defined via ∗ and Π fails Non-
manipulability.
So trust-sensitive revision is manipulable. However, this is
neither surprising nor undesirable. We already showed that
it is not manipulable in the extreme cases. But informally,
the notion of trust means that one agent is willing to believe
things said by another. If we trust an agent to be able to draw
certain distinctions, then we also accept the consequences of
those distinctions when incorporating their reports.
5 Trust Pseudometrics
5.1 Measuring Trust
Thus far, we have assumed that an agent is either trusted to
distinguish certain states, or they are not. This is not sufficient
if we consider situations where several different sources may
provide conflicting information. In such cases, we need to
determine which information source is the most trusted.
In order to capture different levels of trust, we introduce
a measure of the distance between states. Each agent A will
associate a distance function dB over states with each agent
B. If dB(s, t) = 0, then B can not be trusted to distinguish
between the states s and t. If dB(s, t) is large, then A has
a high level of trust in B’s ability to distinguish between s
and t. We will require that the distance function is a pseudo-
ultrametric on the state space, which means that it satisfies
the following properties for all x, y, z:
1. d(x, x) = 0
2. d(x, y) = d(y, x)
3. d(x, z) ≤ max{d(x, y), d(y, z)}
A pseudo-ultrametric differs from an ultrametric in that
d(x, y) = 0 does not imply x = y; this would be undesirable
since we use the distance 0 to represent indistinguishability
rather than identity. The third property is the ultrametric in-
equality, which is a strengthening of the triangle inequality.
Definition 6 If A ∈ A, an ultrametric trust function TA is a
function mapping each B ∈ A to a pseudo-ultrametric dB
on 2F.
The pair (2F, TA) is called a trust space. We associate a se-
quence of state partitions with each trust space.
Definition 7 Let (2F, TA) be a trust space, let B ∈ A, and
let i be a number. For each state s, define: ΠBA(i)(s) = {t |
dB(s, t) ≤ i}.
The following proposition is a known result in the theory of
metric spaces, restated in our setting. The proof requires the
ultrametric inequality.
Proposition 12 For any number i, the collection of sets
{ΠBA(i)(s) | s ∈ 2F} is a state partition. Moreover, if i < j,
then ΠBA(i) is a refinement of Π
B
A(j).
The cells of the partition ΠBA(i) consist of all states that are
separated by a distance of no more than i. Hence, a pseu-
dometric trust space defines a sequence of partitions for each
agent that gets coarser as we increase the index i. Since we
can use Definition 4 to define a trust-sensitive revision opera-
tor from a state partition, we can now define a trust-sensitive
revision operator for any fixed distance i between states. The
simplest such operator is the following.
Definition 8 Let (2F, TA) be a trust space. The trust-
sensitive revision operator forA with respect toB is the trust-
sensitive revision operator given by ΠBA(0).
In other words, given an ultrametric, the simplest revision op-
erator is obtained by saying states are indistinguishable just in
case the distance between them is 0. However, as i increases,
we get different partitions that require greater trust in B to
distinguish between states. In the next section, we use this
sequence of partitions to resolve conflicting reports between
agents that are trusted to differing degrees.
Example 6 We give two ultrametrics that produce the same
basic trust partition. Assume two doctors: a general prac-
titioner D and a specialist S. The vocabulary includes two
symbols: ear and skin. Informally, ear is true if the pa-
tient has an ear infection, and skin is true if the patient has
skin cancer. An ear infection can be diagnosed by any doc-
tor, whereas skin cancer is typically diagnosed by a specialist.
To capture these facts, we define two pseudo-ultrametrics dD
and dS over the states labelled as follows:
s1 = {ear, skin}; s2 = {ear}; s3 = {skin}; s4 = ∅.
s1, s2 s1, s3 s1, s4 s2, s3 s2, s4 s3, s4
dD 1 2 2 2 2 1
dS 2 2 2 2 2 2
Note that S is more trusted thanD to distinguish states related
to skin cancer. As such, S should be believed in the case of
conflicting reports from D and S with respect to such states.
5.2 Multiple Reports
Formally, define a report to be a pair (φ,B) where φ is a
formula andB ∈ A. For simplicity in this section we assume
φ is consistent and also that, given a finite set of reports Φ =
{(φi, Bi) | i < n} incoming to A, we have Bi 6= Bj for
i 6= j. We are interested in using ultrametric trust functions to
address the situation where an agent simultaneously receives
a set of reports from different agents.
Proposition 13 Let {A} ∪B ⊆ A, and let Φ = {(φi, Bi) |
i < n} be a finite set of reports. There exists a number m
such that
⋂
i<n(Π
Bi
A (m)[φi]) 6= ∅.
Hence, for any set of reports, we can get a non-empty inter-
section if we take a sufficiently coarse state partition. In many
cases this partition will be non-trival. Using this proposition,
we define multiple report revision as follows.
Definition 9 Let (2F, TA) be a trust space, let Φ =
{(φi, Bi) | i < n} be a finite set of reports, and let m be
the least number such that
⋂
i<n(Π
Bi
A (m)[φi]) 6= ∅. Given
K, ∗ and≺K , the trust-sensitive revision K ∗BA Φ is the set of
formulas true in
min≺K
({s | s ∈
⋂
i<n
(ΠBiA (m)[φi]}).
Hence, trust-sensitive revision involves finding the finest par-
tition that provides a meaningful combination of the reports,
and then revising with the corresponding state partition.
Example 7 Continuing Example 6, suppose Φ = {(ear ∧
skin,D), (¬skin, S)}. Then the least m such that
ΠDA (m)[ear ∧ skin] ∩ ΠSA(m)[¬skin] 6= ∅ is equal to 1,
for which we have ΠDA (1)[ear ∧ skin] ∩ ΠSA(1)[¬skin] ={s1, s2} ∩ {s2, s4} = {s2}. Thus we make an AGM revi-
sion by ear ∧ ¬skin, i.e., we ignore the part of D’s report
concerning skin before consistently conjoining the 2 reports.
This example demonstrates how ultrametrics can be used to
resolve conflicts by appealing to strength of trust.
The sub-procedure of incrementally weakening the formu-
las φi until consistency is reached is highly reminiscent of the
belief negotiation approach to belief merging [Booth, 2006].
Indeed the specific procedure used here can be viewed as
a variant of one of the negotiation protocols defined there,
which in turn yields a variant of the ∆max merging operator
of [Konieczny and Pino Pe´rez, 2002]. This connection allows
us to describe the set
⋂
i<n(Π
Bi
A (m)[φi]) in Definition 9 di-
rectly in terms of the pseudo-ultrametrics dBi . First some no-
tation. Given the finite set of reports Φ = {(φi, Bi) | i < n},
for each i < n and s ∈ 2F define Ri(s) = min{dBi(s, t) |
t is a model of φi}, i.e., Ri(s) represents the degree to which
Bi can be trusted to distinguish s from a model of φi. Then
we have the following.
Proposition 14 Let Φ = {(φi, Bi) | i < n} be a fi-
nite set of reports, and let m be the least number such that⋂
i<n(Π
Bi
A (m)[φi]) 6= ∅. Then
⋂
i<n(Π
Bi
A (m)[φi]) = {s |
maxi<nRi(s) is minimal}.
6 Discussion
6.1 Related Work
The relationship between trust and belief change is ex-
plored in [Lorini et al., 2014], through a dynamic epistemic
logic(DEL) called DL-BT in which one can express that an
agent A trusts another agent B to be able to determine the
truth of a formula φ with strength α. In DL-BT, the empha-
sis is on iterated belief change and update policies for order-
ings. By contrast, we explicitly build on the AGM approach,
with an emphasis on single-shot revision. Since DL-BT is a
modal logic, there are many superficial differences from our
approach both in terms of syntax and semantics. More im-
portantly, DL-BT differs from our approach in that it defines
trust with respect to an agent’s ability to determine the truth
or falsity of a formula, whereas we define trust with respect
to distinguishable states. Indeed, we have seen that trust-
sensitive revision does not even satisfy Very Weak Success;
an agent may be trusted on φ without being trusted on ¬φ. It
is possible to define trust-sensitive revision based on state par-
titions in a DEL setting, and the resulting logic differs from
DL-BT in a non-trivial manner. We leave the exploration of
our approach in a DEL setting for future work.
Another epistemic logic approach is [Rodenha¨user, 2014].
In that work, a commonality with our approach is that each
agent A is assumed to assign a kind of indicator to every
other agent B to denote the level of trust in B. But rather
than use a state partition or pseudo-ultrametric as we do, the
indicator takes the form of a particular plausibility revision
policy to reflect the strength with which A should incorporate
information from B into its belief state. However the kind
of trust modeled is more like credibility or reliability than
expertise. This last comment also applies to the credibility-
limited revision operators studied in [Hansson et al., 2001].
Additional work on trust has explored reputation systems
[Huynh et al., 2006], task allocation [Ramchurn et al., 2009],
and deception [Salehi-Abari and White, 2009]. One notable
approach with an emphasis on knowledge representation is
[Wang and Singh, 2007], in which trust is built based on ev-
idence; this could be used as a precursor step to build a trust
metric in our framework. Different levels of trust are treated
in [Krukow and Nielsen, 2007], where a lattice structure is
used to represent various levels of trust strength. However,
the emphasis is on the representation of trust in an agent as
opposed to trust in an agent with respect to a domain.
6.2 Conclusion
We have developed an approach to trust-sensitive belief re-
vision in which trust is captured by state partitions. Trust is
handled as a precursor to belief change; the input formula is
relativized to the trust partition prior to revision. The result
is a form of selective revision that satisfies many known pos-
tulates for belief change, but not others. In particular, it fails
to satisfy all but the most extreme weakenings of the success
postulate. Additionally it turns out to falsify our new Non-
manipulability property. We briefly address the manner in
which conflicting reports can be addressed by introducing an
ultrametric on states that can capture a relative degree of trust.
There are many directions for future work. First, we would
like to explicitly characterize trust-sensitive revision by pre-
cisely specifying the underlying class of Kuratowski transfor-
mations. There is also the question of iteration. In principle,
we can relativize any mapping on orderings based on a state
partition; however, further investigation is required to deter-
mine the properties of this approach to iterated revision, be-
cause there is flexibility in handling indistinguishable states
at different levels of an underlying pre-order. We would also
like to address the issue of deception in greater detail; this has
many applications in security and networked communication.
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